Skill	and	Expertise	in	Perception* Susanna	Siegel Forthcoming	in	Routledge	Handbook	of	Skill	and	Expertise, Edited	by	Ellen	Fridland	and	Carlotta	Pavese. We	can	distinguish	theses	that	connect	skill	with	perception	in	general	from	theses that	connect	skill	with	perceptual	experience	in	particular.	Perceptual	experiences are	the	conscious	states	and	episodes	that	are	characteristic	of	perception.	These experiences	are	sensitive	to	how	one's	attention	is	distributed.	One	can	undergo perceptual	experiences	both	in	cases	when	the	experience	leads	to	knowledge,	or	in hallucination	or	illusion.	By	contrast,	perception	in	general	includes	both	perceptual experiences	and	the	unconscious	information	processes	that	give	rise	to	them	via the	perceptual	system.	So	there	is	more	to	perception	than	perceptual	experience. The	focus	of	this	entry	is	the	relationship	of	skills	to	perceptual	experience. How	are	perceptual	experiences	related	to	skills?	According	to	some	researchers, skills	can	be	exercised	only	in	intentional	actions.	But	when	discussing	the relationship	between	skills	and	perceptual	experience,	it's	useful	to	work	with	a broader	notion	of	skill	that	could	count	as	skilled	behavior	the	exercise	of	some recognitional	abilities	that	don't	involve	intentional	action,	such	visually	recognizing avocadoes,	or	your	favorite	sheep	in	the	flock,	or	the	sound	of	A-flat,	without antecedently	intending	to	do	any	of	these	things.	The	broader	notion	of	skill includes	these	forms	of	expertise. It's	clear	that	perceptual	experience	plays	a	central	role	in	skilled	behavior	of	all kinds.	It	is	difficult	(if	not	impossible)	to	catch	a	football	if	you	can't	see	or	otherwise feel	it	coming,	or	to	play	chess	while	blindfolded,	or	to	recognize	your	favorite	sheep without	getting	any	sensory	input.	At	a	minimum,	perceptual	experience	enables these	forms	of	skilled	action. Some	philosophers	go	farther	and	suggest	that perceptual	experience	is	itself	a	kind	of	skilled	action,	or	that	it	constitutively involves	skilled	actions	of	various	kinds.	Whether	or	not	any	version	of	this	further claim	is	true,	there	are	several	important	ways	in	which	perceptual	experiences might	be	thought	to	manifest	a	subject's	skills.	This	entry	focuses	on	three	of	them. Section	1	discusses	the	idea	that	perceptual	experience	consists	in	motor	skills. Second	2	focuses	on	the	idea	that	perceptual	experience	can	consist	partly	in	skilled mental	actions	of	recognition,	such	as	recognizing	a	particular	animal	scurrying	past as	a	mouse.	Section	3	reviews	some	of	the	main	ways	that	various	kinds	of	expertise or	cultural	understanding	manifest	themselves	in	patterns	of	perceptual	attention. *	Thanks	to	Kevin	Connolly,	Kati	Farkas,	Ellen	Fridland,	Zoe	Jenkin,	Samantha	Matherne, Matthew	McGrath,	Jessie	Munton,	and	Carlotta	Pavese	for	criticism	and	discussion. 2 1.	Are	motor	skills	constitutive	of	perceptual	experience? The	20th	century	French	phenomenologist	Maurice	Merleau-Ponty	analyzed perceptual	experience	as	necessarily	engaging	motor	skills.	In	Merleau-Ponty's paradigmatic	cases	of	perception,	the	flow	of	information	taken	in	by	perceivers	is inseparable	from	the	way	they	move	through	a	scene.	On	this	view,	even superficially	static	perceptions	engage	motor	skills,	such	as	seeing	the	color	of	a table	as	uniform	when	different	parts	of	it	are	differently	illuminated.	By	analogy,	in a	dance,	the	dancers'	movements	are	unified	in	their	intake	of	kinesthetic,	tactile, visual	and	auditory	information	to	such	an	extent	that	any	purely	sensory dimensions	of	the	dancing	process	would	be	hard	to	factor	out	from	motor dimensions.	Merleau-Ponty's	focus	on	roles	of	the	body	in	perceptual	experience	has inspired	some	contemporary	thinkers	to	construe	the	sensory	and	motor dimensions	of	perceptual	experience	as	best	understood	as	a	unit,	just	as	they	are	in dancing	(Hurley	1998,	Kelly	1999,	Noë	2005). How	far	could	this	model	plausibly	generalize?	Watching	a	sunset	or	examining	the colors	of	paint	are	other	paradigms	of	perception,	but	they	apparently	need	not involve	doing	much	with	one's	body.	Because	one	is	just	looking,	these	experiences are	more	like	taking	in	a	spectacle	than	actively	creating	one.	Some	followers	of Merleau-Ponty	try	to	make	the	case	that	even	color	perception	involves	the	bodily activity	of	finding	what	Merleau-Ponty	called	the	optimal	point	of	view	from	which the	color	–	or	anything	should	be	viewed.1	According	to	these	interpreters,	we gravitate	toward	optimal	viewpoints,	and	finding	these	optima	is	a	skill	on	par	with knowing	how	to	walk:	it	is	a	learned	skill	that	we	are	innately	disposed	to	develop. What	kind	of	evidence	could	support	the	idea	that	we	are	sensitive	to	visual	optima? The	main	evidence	would	seem	to	be	behavioral	dispositions	to	gravitate	toward optimal	viewpoints	and	feel	uncomfortable	with	suboptimal	ones.	But	if	perceptual experience	in	general	consists	in	exercising	the	skill	of	finding	optimum	viewpoints, and	if	different	qualities	(color,	shape,	motion	and	so	on)	each	have	their	own optimum,	then	we	will	often	have	competing	dispositions.	And	if	that's	our	situation, or	if	for	all	we	know	it	is	our	situation,	then	we	cannot	straightforwardly	take	the behavior	we	find	in	others,	or	the	discomfort	we	feel	in	ourselves,	to	be	the manifestation	of	dispositions	to	move	toward	the	optimum.	There	is	no	obvious feedback	that	indicates	which	behavior	meets	the	optima.	And	if	there	are	neither phenomenological	nor	behavioral	markers	of	such	optima,	for	many	forms	of perception	there	are	no	obvious	success	conditions	for	perceiving	optimally.	So	even if	Dreyfus	and	Kelly's	approach	captures	an	aspect	of	some	perceptual	experiences when	they	are	deeply	integrated	with	bodily	action,	the	analysis	of	these	aspects may	not	support	the	broader	idea	that	perceptual	experience	is	constitutively	an exercise	of	skilled	bodily	action.	Here's	a	case	where	skills	are	construed	as manifesting	in	dispositions	to	navigate	the	social	and	physical	environment	in	a	way that	others	would	be	legible	to	others	in	that	environment,	rather	than	as an	intentional	action. 1	S.	Kelly	1999,	2005,	H.	Dreyfus	2002,	2005. 3 Dreyfus	and	Kelly	focus	on	the	optimal	viewpoints	in	analyzing	Merleau-Ponty's idea	of	the	intentional	arc.	In	developing	this	idea,	Merleau-Ponty	brings	into	focus	a whole	range	of	mental	states	that	situate	us	in	social	and	physical	environments.	As he	puts	it,	the	intentional	arc	is	that	set	of	representations	by	which	we	"project around	us	our	past,	our	future,	our	human	milieu,	our	physical	situation,	our ideological	situation,	and	our	moral	situation,	or	rather,	that	ensures	that	we	are situated	within	all	of	these	relationships".2 Merleau-Ponty	construes	the	intentional	arc	as	an	embodied	mode	of	intentionality. According	to	him,	our	motor	dispositions	embody	a	kind	of	understanding	of	the things	we	perceive	(perhaps	optima	would	be	but	one	example).	For	example,	in	the social	realm,	the	culturally	specific	boundaries	of	personal	space	regulate	how	close we	stand	to	one	another,	and	how	far	we	can	squish	together	on	a	subway	without feeling	that	boundaries	have	been	violated	(Kelly	2005).	Our	bodily	stances	also communicate	cues	of	social	status	and	relationships,	such	as	authority,	deference, and	confidence.	Exhibiting	and	interpreting	these	cues	is	a	form	of	cultural	literacy, expressed	through	the	body,	and	it	constitutively	engages	perceptual	experience. On	this	analysis,	perceptual	experience	constitutively	includes	skills	of	navigating the	social	and	physical	environment,	rather	than	being	a	representation	that mediates	between	sub-personal	perceptual	inputs	and	behavioral	outputs,	in conjunction	with	other	beliefs,	desires	and	preferences.	The	unit	of	analysis	here	is something	that	both	has	a	phenomenological	feel	and	consists	in	a	set	of dispositions	to	respond	to	cultural	and	physical	environments	in	culturally recognizable	ways.3 If	Merleau-Ponty	is	correct,	then	cultural	literacy	is	mediated	by	attention,	including joint	attention.	This	prediction	of	Merleau-Ponty's	is	independently	plausible.	Like other	primates,	humans	follow	the	gaze	of	their	con-specifics	to	direct	their attention	across	all	sorts	of	scenarios.4	Gaze-following	is	part	of	joint	attention,	in which	person	A	attends	can	tell	by	perception	what	person	B	is	attending	to,	and person	A	goes	on	to	attend	to	it	as	well.	In	this	way,	person	B's	attention	directs person	A's	attention.	Joint	attention	is	a	fundamentally	social	form	of	perception	and it	provides	a	basis	for	human	cooperation.	Just	think	of	how	your	attention	has	to	be coordinated	with	another	person's,	if	you	are	going	to	carry	a	table	down	a	flight	of stairs,	or	pass	each	other	a	narrow	path,	or	carry	on	a	conversation.	Actors	in cooperative	human	activities	typically	have	to	presume	that	they	can	direct	their cooperants'	attention	to	the	relevant	part	of	the	flow	of	information.	For	these reasons,	joint	attention	is	part	of	the	basis	on	which	Merleau-Ponty's	intentional	arc could	unfold. 2	Merleau-Ponty	(PhP)	137.	For	further	analysis,	see	Matherne	(2017)	on	MerleauPonty's	notion	of	style. 3	Noe	and	O'Regan	(2001) 4	Eilan	et	al.	(2015) 4 Independently	of	the	picture	inspired	by	Merleau-Ponty	on	which	perceptual experience	is	infused	with	motor	skills,	we	can	also	zoom	in	on	more	piecemeal recognitional	abilities	and	consider	their	relationships	to	perceptual	experience. This	brings	us	to	the	idea	that	perceptual	experience	could	be	constituted	wholly	or in	part	by	exercising	abilities	to	recognize	things,	where	recognition	is	construed	as a	mental	action. 2.	Are	recognitional	dispositions	ever	constitutive	of	perceptual	experience? Chances	are	good	that	you	can	recognize	avocados	by	sight,	or	your	housemate's footsteps	on	the	stairs	by	the	patterns	of	sound,	or	coffee	brewing	by	its	smell.	What kind	of	knowledge	do	you	have,	when	you	know	what	avocados	look	like,	or	when you	know	what	someone's	footsteps	sound	like,	or	what	coffee	smells	like? A	first	possibility	is	that	you	have	some	articulable	knowledge	detailing	the	features by	which	you	can	recognize	avocados.	Even	if	you	had	never	seen	avocados	before, someone	could	describe	them	to	you,	and	you	could	learn	from	them	that	avocados are	oval,	and	than	depending	on	the	variety	they	have	either	blackish	thick	skin	with knobby	texture,	or	greenish	thin	skin	that's	relatively	smooth.	In	this	way,	you	could know	this	is	what	avocados	look	like,	even	if	you	had	never	actually	seen	one. A	second	possibility	is	that	your	knowledge	of	what	things	look	like	could	consist ultimately	in	an	ability	to	recognize	them	(as	per	Lewis	1990).	For	instance,	if housemate	Jack	has	a	bad	knee,	it	might	give	his	gait	a	distinctive	rhythm	that	you can	recognize	when	you	hear	it.	A	rhythmic	sophisticate	might	know	that	the interval	in	between	the	sound	of	the	left	foot	stepping	and	the	sounds	of	the	right foot	landing	is	one-and-a-half	times	longer	than	the	interval	between	right	foot stepping	and	left	foot	landing,	and	might	be	able	to	describe	the	sound	of	Jack's steps	to	you	even	if	neither	of	you	had	ever	heard	any	gait	like	that.	But	let's suppose	that	you're	not	a	rhythmic	sophisticate,	and	that	no	one	has	ever	described anyone's	gait	to	you	before.	You	still	might	simply	know	how	to	identify	Jack	on	the basis	of	the	sound	of	his	footsteps. Your	knowledge	would	consist	in	an	ability	to recognize	Jack.	If	you	lacked	the	ability,	then	on	this	analysis,	you	would	lack	the knowledge	as	well. Let's	focus	on	this	second	option,	and	call	it	the	purely	practical	one.5 Is	perceptual experience	then	constituted	either	by	acquiring	or	by	exercising	such	abilities?	If	so, then	that	may	be	because	perceptual	experience	is	partly	constituted	by	having these	abilities,	in	which	case	we	have	an	example	of	the	thesis	that	perceptual experience	is	constituted	by	a	type	of	mental	action. 5	Matherne	(2014)	argues	that	this	position	is	found	in	Kant.	Pavese	(2015)	defends a	mixed	view.	For	useful	discussion	of	perceptual	recognition	in	general,	see	Brewer (2011),	McGrath	(2017)	and	Millar	(2019). 5 Alternatively,	what	if	perceptual	experience	is	purely	an	occasion	for	exercising recognitional	abilities?	Sometimes	we	have	a	concept,	such	as	rose,	and	we	have	the disposition	to	recognize	roses,	but	we	fail	to	apply	the	concept	to	a	rose	we encounter.	Kant	described	this	type	of	situation	when	discussing	a	physician	who sometimes	makes	errors	of	judgment.6	If	this	situation	can	arise	with	every	concept we	have,	then	recognition	and	perceptual	experience	are	only	contingently connected. This	type	of	contingency	can	occur	in	different	strengths.	Its	strongest	form	allows that	perceptual	experience	never	constitutively	involves	the	application	of	any recognitional	dispositions	at	all. In	that	case,	perceptual	experiences	enables recognition	of	things,	but	is	not	constituted	by	recognitional	abilities,	even	in	part. In	a	weaker	form,	in	every	perceptual	experience,	some	recognitional	dispositions are	exercised,	but	no	recognitional	disposition	that	is	guaranteed	to	be	exercised	on every	occasion	on	which	it	would	be	fitting	to	do	so.	This	weak	form	reintroduces	a type	of	constitutive	link	between	perceptual	experiences	and	recognitional dispositions. Just	as	we	can	ask	how	perceptual	experience	relates	to	practical	ability	to	recognize things	like	roses,	we	can	ask	a	parallel	question	about	the	relationship	between perceptual	experiences	and	introspection.	When	you	know	what	it's	like	to	see	red, you	know	something	about	the	character	of	a	type	of	visual	experience.	In	Frank Jackson's	thought	experiment,	a	neuroscientist	Mary	who	is	said	to	know	all	the physical	facts	sees	red	for	the	first	time	after	living	in	a	black	and	white	room.	What does	Mary	come	to	know,	when	she	learns	what	it's	like	to	see	red?	According	to some	philosophers,	knowing	what	it's	like	to	see	red	is	ultimately	a	kind	of	ability	to self-ascribe	a	phenomenal	type	of	experience.7	If	they	are	right,	then	knowing	what it's	like	to	have	this	type	of	color	experience	is	an	irreducibly	practical	ability. 3. How	can	perceptual	attention	reflect	the	subject's	skill? There	are	many	ways	in	which	specialized	expertise	including	modes	of	being culturally	embedded	can	manifest	itself	in	patterns	of	attention. 6	Kant	imagines	a	physician,	judge	or	statesman	who	"can	have	many	fine pathological,	juridical,	or	political	rules	in	his	head,	of	which	he	can	even	be	a thorough	teacher,	and	yet	can	easily	stumble	in	their	application,	either	because	he is	lacking	in	the	natural	power	of	judgment	(though	not	in	understanding),	and	to	be sure	understands	the	universal	in	abstracto	but	cannot	distinguish	whether	a	case	in concreto	belongs	under	it,	or	also	because	he	has	not	received	adequate	training	for this	judgment	through	examples	and	actual	business"	KrV	A134/B173.	Matherne (2014)	discusses	this	example	in	connection	with	perceptual	experience. 7	Lewis	(1990) 6 When	you	perceive	a	scene,	your	attention	is	always	distributed	in	a	way	that	puts some	things	into	the	foreground	and	other	thing	into	the	periphery.	How	your attention	is	distributed	can	depend	on	other	factors	as	well,	including	whether	the scene	contains	the	types	of	stimuli	that	"grab"	your	attention,	such	as	a	sudden movements,	bright	flashes,	loud	bangs,	or	unexpected	behavior. It	can	also	depend	on	what	you're	already	in	the	midst	of	doing,	and	on	how	well you	know	how	to	do	it.	For	instance,	a	softball	player	at	the	bat	knows	where	to	look to	figure	out	what	kind	of	pitch	is	coming	and	how	best	to	hit	it.	A	pickpocket observing	a	potential	victim	knows	which	gestures	indicate	where	the	victim	keeps his	wallet,	and	whether	he	is	sufficiently	distracted	not	to	notice	a	hand	reaching	in to	take	it	out.	Someone	lacking	expertise	in	thievery	who	is	watching	the	very	same man	could	easily	have	no	idea	where	his	wallet	is,	let	alone	how	to	snatch	it. Distributions	of	attention	can	also	depend	on	scientific	expertise.	Faced	with	the same	sequence	of	x-ray	images,	a	radiologist	and	a	novice	will	parse	each	image differently.	To	the	radiologist,	some	patterns	of	lines	and	light	contrast	stand	out from	others,	whereas	the	novice	finds	no	difference	in	kind	between	them.	The radiologist's	expertise	allows	her	to	find	the	tumors	in	the	image. She	knows	what to	look	for,	and	she	knows	when	she	has	found	it.	And	moving	down	a	continuum from	scientific	expertise	to	expertise	gained	merely	by	exposure,	someone	used	to seeing	toads	is	better	than	someone	with	less	exposure	to	at	finding	a	toad camouflaged	on	a	tree.8 The	18th-century	Scottish	philosopher	Thomas	Reid	observed	that	patterns	of exposure	to	things	could	lead	perceivers	to	differentiate	between	properties	that previously	were	indistinguishable	to	them. For	example,	a	wine	ignoramus	may taste	no	difference	between	five	different	wines,	whereas	a	wine	expert	can	tell them	apart.	A	birder	can	see	the	visible	differences	between	two	kinds	of	ducks, whereas	a	duck	novice	can't	tell	them	apart.9	Pairs	of	phonemes	that	sound	different to	speakers	of	a	language	sound	the	same	to	people	who	don't	understand	that language.	In	these	ways,	expertise	can	improve	perceptual	acuity. Expertise	in	birds,	wine,	and	language	improves	the	overall	epistemic	position	of	the experts	in	these	examples.	But	in	other	contexts,	selective	improvement	in	acuity introduces	perceptual	asymmetries	that	highlight	epistemic	limitations.	The	prime example	is	facial	differentiation.	In	racially	segregated	parts	of	the	United	States,	the most	lengthy	and	socially	valued	interactions	occur	primarily	among	people	who share	a	socially	designated	'race'.	People	who	are	designated	regularly	as	belonging a	racial	category,	such	as	white,	and	who	interact	mainly	with	the	same	are	much better	at	visually	discriminating	between	different	white	faces,	and	much	worse	at 8	This	observation	about	toads	is	an	instance	of	the	general	claim	that	being	used	to seeing	F's	gives	you	a	facility	at	perceptually	distinguishing	F's	from	their background.	For	discussion,	see	Goldstone	(2015)	and	Connolly	(2019). 9	Pylyshyn,	Z.	1999,	Goldstone	(2015),	Connolly	(2019). 7 visually	discriminating	between	faces	of	people	belonging	to	other	races.10	This pattern	of	interaction	has	an	adverse	effect	on	the	ability	to	discriminate	between faces	of	the	people	belonging	to	the	socially	designated	"races"	with	whom	they	do not	interact. When	new	abilities	to	differentiate	within	a	category	(such	as	faces,	wines,	or	birds) emerge	from	a	long	pattern	of	exposure	to	instances	of	that	category,	the	process	is known	as	perceptual	learning.11	Perceptual	learning	differs	from	perceptual development,	which	is	a	matter	of	brain	maturation.	Even	the	most	mature perceptual	systems	can	undergo	perceptual	learning. When	a	perceiver's	acuity	within	a	category	increases	due	to	perceptual	learning, her	perceptual	experiences	reflect	both	her	ability	to	differentiate	and	her	past pattern	of	exposure	to	instances	of	the	category. Perceptual	learning	is	most	often	illustrated	by	improved	acuity	in	categorization. But	the	general	idea	that	long-term	changes	in	acuity	can	result	from	practice	and experience	applies	to	perception	of	structures	as	well.	Gaining	practice	and expertise	in	music,	for	example,	can	improve	the	ability	to	find	the	beat	in	a	piece	of music	and	keep	track	of	it.	A	beat	is	the	temporal	structure	of	a	piece	of	music.	It may	or	may	not	have	an	audible	expression	(for	instance	in	the	pattern	of	sounds made	by	a	drumbeat).	A	long-term	change	in	sensitivity	to	this	kind	of	temporal structure	due	to	patterns	of	exposure	or	practice	trying	to	find	the	beat	belongs	to the	same	family	of	perceptual	influences	as	improvements	in	acuity	within	a category.12 Aside	from	categorization	and	differentiation,	perceptual	learning	in	an	extended sense	can	take	the	form	of	social	facility	in	a	culture.	In	any	human	interaction among	adults,	some	possibilities	of	interaction	are	foregrounded	and	others	are backgrounded,	and	normally	it	is	commonly	known	what	the	main	options	are	for how	the	situation	is	likely	to	unfold.	For	instance,	it	is	possible	to	learn	the	social cues	that	someone	wants	to	shake	your	hand,	catch	your	eye,	talk	to	you,	or	avoid you,	and	these	possibilities	of	interactions	are	learned	and	can	be	culturally	specific. Another	way	for	cultural	embeddings	to	shape	perceptual	experience	brings	us	back to	joint	attention.	Alongside	its	role	in	social	coordination,	joint	attention	is	also	a means	by	which	people	develop	sensitivity	of	social	value.	Adams	and	Kveraga (2015)	present	experimental	evidence	that	in	the	United	States,	the	extent	of	gaze- 10	This	effect	is	known	as	the	cross-race	effect.	For	an	overview	see	Meissner,	C.A	et	al (2001). 11	Goldstone	(2015),	Connolly	(2017)	[sep] 12	On	rhythm	perception,	see	Boll-Avetisyan,	N	et	al	(2017). 8 following	behavior	is	sometimes	sensitive	to	race	and	social	power.	To	a	statistically significant	degree,	Americans	of	European	descent	(white	participants)	followed	the gaze	of	white	faces	but	did	not	follow	the	gaze	of	Americans	of	African	descent (black	participants),	whereas	black	participants	followed	the	gaze	of	both	groups	of faces.	To	the	extent	that	gaze-following	indicates	confidence	that	the	followedperson's	object	of	attention,	or	experience	of	it,	is	epistemically	valuable,	it	is reasonable	to	hypothesize	that	this	result	reflects	an	underlying	pattern	of	social valuation,	and	specifically	the	epistemic	under-valuation	of	black	adults	by	white adults. Merleau-Ponty	would	predict	that	a	person's	cultural	embedding	can	affect distributions	of	attention,	and	this	prediction	too	is	borne	out.	Eberhardt	(2003) found	that	the	cultural	stereotype	that	associates	black	men	and	crime	becomes	a 'visual	tuning	device'	that	directs	attention	in	toward	stereotype-congruent information,	and	away	from	stereotype-incongruent	information.13 For	instance,	in one	experimental	paradigm,	participants	were	primed	with	the	face	of	a	man	and then	shown	a	series	of	image	that	gradually	morphed	into	a	clear	image	from	a	noisy one.	Participants	find	crime-related	objects	such	as	guns	and	knives	at	a	lower threshold	after	seeing	the	face	of	a	man	who	is	black,	compared	to	the	threshold	at which	they	report	such	objects	after	seeing	the	face	of	a	man	who	is	white.	And when	the	primed	face	is	black,	participants	find	crime-related	objects	at	a	lower threshold	than	they	find	non-crime	related	objects	such	as	watches	or	bugles. In	another	experimental	paradigm	involving	a	'dot-probe'	task,	participants	are	first quickly	shown	a	subliminal	crime-related	prime,	such	as	a	picture	of	a	gun, fingerprint,	police	badge,	or	handcuff.	The	image	is	flashed	too	quickly	for	them	to report	what	they	see.	They	are	then	shown	two	male	faces,	one	black	and	one	white, and	after	the	faces	disappear,	a	dot	appears	in	the	place	where	one	of	the	two	faces was	shown.	With	a	crime	prime,	participants	find	the	dot	more	quickly	when	it replaces	black	male	face,	compared	to	when	it	replaces	a	white	male	face,	and compared	to	when	there	is	no	prime	at	all.	Eberhardt	takes	this	experiment	to	show that	crime	prime	directs	attention	to	black	male	faces.	Here,	culturally	entrenched stereotypes	produce	associations	that	in	turn	facilitate	patterns	of	attention	that reflect	those	stereotypes. Finally,	both	ethical	and	aesthetic	engagement	can	take	the	form	of	patterns	of attention	as	well,	and	in	these	ways,	perceptual	skills	are	central	to	both	ethics	and aesthetics.	Consider	a	long	and	complicated	piece	of	classical	music.	Musically engaged	people	can	direct	their	attention	to	structures	within	the	music, distinguishing	a	theme	from	its	development,	and	finding	other	aesthetically relevant	features	of	the	music.	When	attention	is	distributed	this	way,	the	musically important	features	of	the	symphony	are	made	salient	(a	point	emphasized	by	Nanay 2015). In	ethics,	as	philosopher	and	novelist	Iris	Murdoch	emphasized,	in	some cases,	acting	well	consists	in	part	in	noticing	the	good-making	or	bad-making 13	For	some	criticisms	of	statistical	analysis	in	Eberhardt's	study,	see	Francis	2016. 9 features	of	a	scene,	or	the	features	that	call	for	specific	kinds	of	moral	action,	such	as giving	up	one's	seat	on	a	bus	for	someone	who	needs	it	more	badly.	One	could	see these	dispositions	as	a	kind	of	moral	skill	in	the	form	of	perception,	an	idea developed	at	length	in	a	quite	different	ways	by	Bengson	et	al	(forthcoming), Fridland	2017,	Mandelbaum	1955,	and	Murdoch	1967.14 Bibliography Adams,	R.	and	K.	Kveraga	2015.	Social	Vision:	Functional	Forecasting	and	the	Integration	of Compound	Social	Cues. Review	of	Philosophy	and	Psychology	6	(4):591-610. Bengson,	J.,	T.	Cuneo,	and	R.	Shafer-Landau (Forthcoming).	Grasping	Morality:	Moral Intuitionism.	Oxford	University	Press. Boll-Avetisyan,	N.,	Bhatara,	A.,	&	Höhle,	B.	(2017).	Effects	of	Musicality	on	the	Perception	of Rhythmic	Structure	in	Speech.	Laboratory	Phonology:	Journal	of	the	Association	for Laboratory	Phonology,	8(1),	9.	DOI:	http://doi.org/10.5334/labphon.91 Connolly,	K.	2017	Perceptual	Learning.	The	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy	(Summer 2017	Edition),	Edward	N.	Zalta	(ed.),	URL	= <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/perceptual-learning/>. Connolly,	K.	2019.	Perceptual	learning:	The	Flexibility	of	the	Senses Dreyfus,	B. Eberhardt,	J.	et	al,	2004.	Seeing	Black:	Race,	crime,	and	visual	processing. Eilan,	N.,	C.	Hoerl,	J.	Roessler	2015.	Joint	attention:	communication,	and	other	minds.	Oxford University	Press. Francis,	G.	2016. "Implications	of	"Too	Good	to	Be	True"	for	Replication,	Theoretical	Claims, and	Experimental	Design:	An	Example	Using	Prominent	Studies	of	Racial	Bias."	Frontiers	in Psychology	(7):	1382. Published	online	2016	Sep	22. Fridland,	E.	2017.	Motor	skill	and	moral	virtue.	Royal	Institute	of	Philosophy	Supplement 80,	139-70.	doi:10.1017/S1358246117000078 Goldstone,	R.	(2015)	Perceptual	Learning.	In	M.	Matthen,	ed.	Oxford	Handbook	of	the Philosophy	of	Perception.	Oxford	University	Press. Hurley,	S.	1998.	Consciousness	in	action.	Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press. Kant,	I.	Critique	of	Pure	Reason. Kelly,	S.	2005.	Seeing	things	in	Merleau-Ponty. Lewis,	D.K.	1990.	"What	experience	teaches".	In	W.	Lycan,	ed.	mind	and	Cognition.	Blackwell. 29-57. Mandelbaum,	M.	1955.	The	Phenomenology	of	Moral	Experience.	Baltimore:	Johns	Hopkins Press. Matherne,	S.	2014.	Kant	and	the	art	of	schematism.	Kantian	Review.	19(2):	181-205	(2014) Matherne,	S.	2017.	"Merleau-Ponty	on	Style	as	the	Key	to	Perceptual	Presence	and Constancy."	Journal	of	the	History	of	Philosophy	55(4):	693-727. Merleau-Ponty,	M.	The	phenomenology	of	perception. McGrath,	M.	Knowing	what	things	look	like.	Philosophical	Review	126(1):	1-41. 14	For	more	on	these	ideas,	see	Bengson	(forthcoming),	M.	Mandelbaum	(1955), Murdoch	(1956). 10 Meissner,	C.A.,	&	Brigham,	J.C.	(2001).	Thirty	years	of	investigating	the	own-race	bias	in memory	for	faces:	A	meta-analytic	review.	Psychology,	Public	Policy,	and	Law,	7,	3–35. Millar,	A.	2019.	Knowing	by	Perceiving.	Oxford	University	Press. Murdoch,	I.	1956.	"Vision	and	Choice	in	Morality"	Aristotelian	Society	Supplementary Volume	30	(1):14–58. Murdch,	I.	1967.	The	Sovereignty	of	Good	New	York:	Routledge. Nanay,	Bence	(2015).	Aesthetic	attention.	Journal	of	Consciousness	Studies_	22	(5-6):96-118. Noë,	A.	2005.	Action	in	Perception.	Cambridge:	MIT	Press. Noë,	A.	and	K.	O'Regan	2001.	"A	sensorimotor	account	of	vision	and	visual	consciousnessAuthors'	Response-Acting	out	our	sensory	experience.	_Behavioral	and	Brain	Sciences	24 (5):1011. Pavese,	C.	2015.	Practical	Senses.	Philosophers'	Imprint	15(29). Pavese,	C.	(2019).	The	psychological	reality	of	practical	representation.	Philosophical Psychology,	32(5),	784-821. Pylyshyn	(1999),	Is	Vision	Continuous	with	Cognition?	The	Case	for	Cognitive	Impenetrability of	Visual	Perception,	"Behavioral	and	Brain	Sciences",	22,	pp.	341–423.